反思“以夷制夷”战略

对于中国汽车行业监管人来说，如果日本汽车制造商衰败得太快，那么“以夷制夷”战略是否还行之有效？

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“以夷制夷”的外交战略产生于1000多年前的宋代，但使它变得更为知名是1848年后的晚清，面对着八个西方工业化国家，当时这个贫弱的王朝又祭起了这个法宝。平衡八个列强被认为某种程度上成功地保障了大清帝国的利益，随后一些清代学者们提出了一个自然的后续策略——“师夷长技以制夷”。显然，第一步的“平衡列强”只是阻止情况进一步恶化，而第二步“向列强学习”才是真正治愈弱势地位的方法。

当然，清朝在1911年的彻底失败，使得这个产生于公元1100年左右的“以夷制夷”策略成为可笑的贬义词，而不再含有其刚产生时的中性意义。清朝的失败有许多原因，但其失败并不能说明这个策略本身毫无价值；相反，它们可能是当时一个弱势竞争者可以抓住和利用的最有效的方法和选择。

现在回头再看中国的汽车行业——从许多角度观察，其弱势地位在1980年代至1990年代甚至直到现在都与清朝的国家环境相似。著名的“市场换技术”政策不过是现代版“师夷长技以制夷”而已。

由于所有制原因，一些国有汽车制造商缺乏基本的动力或意愿向合资伙伴学习，使得“学习”策略在一定程度上成为瘸腿战略。然而，行业决策者至少在“平衡列强势力”即实质上的“以夷制夷”战略上没有犯重大失误。

从2012年初开始，前三名的汽车制造商，大众、通用和现代集团开始显现出更强劲的势头，排名前三厂商的车型甚至垄断了中国市场十大畅销车型。这种竞争格局在从1980年代早期到现在中国开放汽车市场30年中从来没有发生过。

与此同时，2012年9月，中日领土纷争导致日本制造商的销售量急剧下降。丰田、日产和本田销售量在2012年第四季度下降了一半。2012年底它们的市场份额开始恢复，但即便如此，日系车厂看上去将很难在未来与其他主要全球竞争对手在中国的增长速度相匹敌。行业监管者一直期盼的市场集中度终于开始巩固，对许多行业人士来说，没有日系汽车厂商排名在前还是令人诧异的，至少多数人会认为丰田和日产是两个强有力的竞争者。

当然，最担心的仍然是孱弱的自主品牌。这些本地品牌市场份额从2010年的33%峰值下降到现在不到乘用车销量（轿车、MPV和SUV）的29%，正在远离官方40%市场份额的目标。

自主品牌的份额在2012年第四季度反弹，一部分原因确实是由于日系车的下滑让出的一些市场，而更大原因则是由于自主品牌过于自信会获得一些日本厂商的市场份额，因而推动生产使得短期内的批发销售数字好看。实际上，日本汽车制造商销量的下降对自主品牌有利仅仅是短期利好而已，中远期并不是福音。

最大问题在于，如果这些日本汽车制造商份额下降得极快，从中远期来看蚕食其市场份额最多的一定是其他主要的全球竞争对手，并进一步巩固市场集中度，而非市场因素正使得这种变化趋势加速。

在当前阶段，自主品牌别说和排名靠前的厂商竞争，甚至连减慢这几个厂商的发展速度都做不到，那么当顶级厂商彻底统治和主导市场并实现超高的生产规模和“超级平台”以后，自主品牌即便在看家的中低细分市场的丁点优势也将荡然无存。

自主品牌还能继续侥幸偷生吗？尤其是当国有汽车制造商没有强烈的“师夷长技以制夷”的意愿，而私营自主厂商既缺资金又没有可供学习的外方合资伙伴。

换句话说，日本汽车厂商市场份额的快速萎缩并不符合“以夷制夷”的战略精神，也并不符合自主品牌的最大利益。最好的结果依然是让这些全球厂商在相当长的一段时间内各自比较平均地占有一定市场份额，而不是相反！

对于中国汽车行业监管人来说，如果日本汽车制造商衰败得太快，那么“以夷制夷”战略是否还行之有效？这也许是一个掺杂了非市场因素的很难回答的问题，但却是必须考虑和直面的难题。另一个角度来说，一个汽车厂商在一个国家越是强大，就越应该谦虚一些；因为一个汽车厂家再强大也难以战胜一个国家和整个社会舆论。在20多年前的某个时期，丰田曾在美国市场发展得过快，他们意识到这样可能会适得其反，就决定放缓速度。

对于现在中国汽车市场上排名靠前的顶级厂商，充分了解和理解“以夷制夷”和“师夷长技以制夷”这两种策略的发展历史和实质精神可能会使自己更理智和冷静一些；让自己保持一种像丰田在美国市场那样谦虚的姿态可能是比较聪明的选择！

Quest for balance of power in the market

Industry supervisors have to consider whether the “balancing foreign players”

strategy still works if Japanese carmakers drop too quickly

Though militarily weak， the Song Dynasty （960-1279）， was able to sustain its empire among stronger neighbors for more than 300 years through a unique diplomatic strategy that played nomadic northern armies off against each other.

The strategy was again proposed by advisors in the late Qing Dynasty （1644-1911） as it weakened under invasions by industrialized Western powers.

To balance one power against another was optimistically believed to somehow save the empire.

Some royal officials and scholars also proposed the strategy of "learning from foreign powers to compete with them". But time ran out before the idea could be fully implemented.

After the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911， the phrase "balancing foreign powers" became a derogatory term different than its original meaning when created 1，000 years before.

The dynasty failed for many reasons， but the failure itself does not prove the folly of the strategy. Instead， it was probably the best available approach that a weak government could use.

A similar dynamic has arrived in China's auto industry. From many angles， domestic producers were in a weak position in the 1980s and 1990s - and to a large degree even now - battling a competitive landscape similar to that faced by the Qing.

The famous market opening-up in exchange for technology is but a modern edition the strategy， though how much domestic players have learned remains a big question mark.

But at least it marked a starting point for indigenous brands to begin assembly， supply chains and training of talent.

Yet due to their ownership structure， some State-owned carmakers lack the basic motivation or willingness to learn from their joint venture partners， to some extent crippling the strategy.

That doesn't mean that policymakers had major flaw in their version of balancing international competitors - a de facto "playing off" strategy.

Ridgeline forms

But three years after China became the world's largest car market in 2009， a ridgeline formed in the industry and market.

After years of effort， the top three automakers - Volkswagen， General Motors and Hyundai/Kia - started to show even stronger momentum in 2012 as they captured bigger market share. Today their cars almost monopolize the list of the 10 best-selling models in China.

This kind of competitive landscape was new in the 30 years following the opening of the auto market in the early 1980s. The top-selling Ford Focus alone delivered 296，000 units in 2012， almost half the total number of cars sold in the country in 1997.

Meanwhile， in September of 2012， the China-Japan territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands resulted in a drastic drop in Japanese car sales.

Most of the major Japanese manufacturers - Toyota， Nissan and Honda - saw their sales halved in the fourth quarter of 2012.

Though they rebounded a bit in the first quarter of 2013， it looks like it will be very hard for them to match the growth pace of other major global competitors this year.

The market has finally begun to consolidate， with the strong getting stronger and weak becoming weaker， though that might not be what the top economic planning body， the National Development and Reform Commission， expected or planned.

For many， it is now surprising that no Japanese carmaker ranks among the top three. Industry insiders would consider Toyota and Nissan two strong candidates.

But of course the most worrying aspect is the weak performance of so-called "indigenous brands".

The market share for local brands has dropped from a peak of 33 percent in 2010 to less than 29 percent of total passenger vehicle sales - including sedans， MPVs and SUVs - sliding further away from the NRDC's target of 40 percent.

Their share did climb a bit in the last quarter of 2012， partly due to the decline of Japanese brands and partly from a push by local automakers to boost production based on their over-confidence in grabbing the market share lost by Japanese brands.

It indeed helped local carmakers， but only in the short term， or at most for the middle term.

True winners

The tough question is if the Japanese carmakers decrease very quickly， what companies will benefit over the long haul？ The true winners will likely be other top global competitors.

At the current stage， there is no way local carmakers can compete with top international brands.

And when the big automakers become more dominant in the marketplace and achieve super-high economies of scale in production， can local carmakers still have chance even in the middle and lower-end segments？

The answer is no， especially when some State-owned carmakers do not have strong motivation in "learning from foreign powers" and some local private carmakers have no international partners to learn from.

In other words， fast shrinking market share for Japanese carmakers does not look like it fits the "balancing powers" strategy. And it might not be in the best interest of local carmakers either.

Japanese companies have the product and quality that all other global automakers have to worry about. It makes the other global companies pay more respect to the market and consumers.

Because humility is still important in the strong.

A good example was when Toyota developed too fast in the US market and realized that could backfire. The company decided to slow down and help competitors， supplier partners and even non-automotive companies by sharing their experience with production and quality control.

The gestures gained more friendly treatment from the consumers and society， helping Toyota's long-term sustainable development.

Industry supervisors have to consider whether the "balancing foreign players" strategy still works if Japanese carmakers drop too quickly.

For dominant automakers in China today， it might be a good idea to truly understand the two strategies and histories - and stay humble like Toyota did in the US.