Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons fo

Abstract

The hemorrhagic acts of the Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants in Nigeria warrants an exhaustive discourse on terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria. This paper argues that countering terrorism in Nigeria involves understanding the nexus of extremism and criminality in the political， social and religious spheres. It argues in line with Cockayne （2011） that there is a growing recognition internationally that criminal networks （both local and transnational） threaten not only to fuel violent conflict， but also to undermine democratic gains-by criminalising politics and instrumentalising continuing disorder. This author addresses this issue using literature evidence and ethno-methodology （ethnography and historiography） to advance this discourse. The author reviews historical evidence on terrorism， proposes some relative theoretical explanations and suggests economic， security and socio-psychological measures to counter terrorism in Nigeria.

Key words： Terrorism； Counter terrorism； Boko Haram； Militancy in Nigeria

Don John O. Omale （2013）. Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Nigeria： Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public Policy. Canadian Social Science， 9（3）， -0. Available from： http：///index.php/css/article/view/j.css.1923669720130903.2916

DOI： http：///10.3968/j.css.1923669720130903.2916.

INTRODUCTION

In West Africa and the Sahel， Cockayne （2011） argues that illicit flows of money， arms and drugs are fuelling the criminalisation of politics and a growing kidnapping and ransom market， which is in turn fuelling al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb （AQIM）. In Nigeria， development and democracy are both threatened by the oil-stealing militancy in the south-east， and Boko Haramism in the north which is increasingly dabbling into terrorist tactics. All of these criminal and extremist behaviours are rewarding some elites involved in criminal， religious and political entrepreneurialism. This paper therefore argues in consonance with Cockayne that countering terrorism in Nigeria involves understanding the normative （when sovereignty protects criminality）， analytic （different understandings of what Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militancy is） and strategic confusion within politics； vis-à-vis the socio-economic， criminal and religious variables in the country. The paper looks at institutional conceptualization of terrorism and gives an historical and international overview of the emergence of terrorism. It also looks at the theories of terrorism； as well as some potential counter terrorism measures that might be relevant to Nigeria. The paper is an outcome of the author’s tripartite efforts： professional experience as criminologist and victimologist， his training in counter terrorism and desktop empiricism.

1. THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

The International Terrorism and Security Research （ITSR） allude to the fact that terrorism is not new， and that even though the word has been used since the beginning of recorded history it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism according to the ITSR has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy； a crime and a holy duty； a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. The United States Department of Defense （USDD） defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear； intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political， religious， or ideological.” Within this definition， there are three key elements―violence， fear， and intimidation―and each element produce terror in its victims. The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government， the civilian population， or any segment thereof， in furtherance of political or social objectives." The U.S. Department of State （USDS） defines terrorism as "premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents， usually intended to influence an audience”.

Outside the United States Government， there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations （1992） defines terrorism as； “An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action， employed by （semi-） clandestine individual， group or state actors， for idiosyncratic， criminal or political reasons， whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.” The most commonly accepted academic definition of terrorism starts with the U.N. definition quoted above. However， the British Home Office （1974） defines terrorism as “the use of violence for political ends， and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public， or any section of the public， in fear.” （See ITSR at http：///）.

From the above definitions therefore， The International Terrorism and Security Research （ITSR） argues that terrorism is a political and criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim， and that the strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace， the government， and the world to their cause. The effectiveness of the terrorist act therefore lies not in the act itself， but in the public’s or government’s reaction to the act. For example， the ITSR argues that in 1972 at the Munich Olympics， the Black September Organization killed 11 Israelis to express their views on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. The Israelis were the immediate victims but the true target was the estimated 1 billion people watching the televised event. Similarly， in October 1983， the ITSR argues that the Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Their immediate victims were the 241 U.S. military personnel who were killed and over 100 others who were wounded. Their true target was the American people and the U.S. Congress to withdraw the Marines from Beirut.

Hence terrorists believe they are legitimate combatants， fighting for what they believe in， by whatever means possible. That is why the ITSR argues that terrorists take great pains to foster a “Robin Hood” image in hope of swaying the general public’s point of view toward their cause. For instance， Boko Haram has killed over 3，000 persons in Nigeria since it commenced operations， but public opinion are divided after the JTF’s onslaught with the insurgents in Baga， Borno State on 16th April， 2013 killing about 85 insurgents （including women and children that were used as shields）. This sympathetic view of terrorism the ITSR argues ‘has become an integral part of their psychological warfare and needs to be countered vigorously’.

2. HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

In Nigeria， terrorism is fast becoming an emerging challenge to national security. According to Azazi （former NSA） as cited in （Obene， 2012） “The Nigerian nation is not prepared for the spate of violence we are experiencing”. This paper however argues that there have been signs and symptoms of terrorism in Nigeria before now； because according to McNamara （1990， p.17） ‘any society that seeks to achieve adequate security against the background of acute food shortage， population explosion， low level of productivity and per capita income， low technological development， inadequate and insufficient public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment； （religious intolerance and criminal politicking） has a false sense of security.

Though Nigeria has remained a relatively peaceful and terror free country between 1967 and 1970， Obene （2012） argues that the killing of Mr Dele Giwa， by a ‘Letter Bomb’ in October 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use Improvised Explosive Devices （IEDs） in Nigeria. Subsequently， the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy hijacked a Nigeria Airways aircraft in October 1993 following the annulment of Chief M.K.O.Abiola’s presidential election. After this， a vicious bomb blast ripped Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium in August 1994.

Several other incidents have occurred since then. For instance between 1996 and 1998 there was bomb attack on the car of the then Chief Security Officer of Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria， Dr Omoshola. Subsequently， the escort car of the former Military Administrator of Lagos State， Brig Gen MB Marwa （Rtd） was attacked.

Other notable acts of terrorism in Nigeria can be summarized as follows： General sectarian violence in Jos （2004， 2010， and 2011）. Series of bombings and killings in Maiduguri （since 2004 to date）. The 2010 New Year’s Eve bombing of Mogadishu Military Cantonment Mammy Market Abuja. The May 29 2010 Presidential Inauguration bombing in Abuja. The 1st October 2010 bombing in Abuja that disorganised the marking of Nigeria’s 50th Independence Anniversary. The Mammy Market bombings in Bauchi， and Zuba near Abuja in 2011.

Post-April 2011 Presidential Election violence in the Northern parts of Nigeria. April 8， 2011 Suleja INEC office bombing. May 29， 2011 bombing of social drinking sports in Maiduguri and Zuba an outskirts of Abuja. June 16， 2011 Nigeria Police Force Headquarters bombing in Abuja . August 26， 2011 bombing of UN House in Abuja. Nov 4， 2011 bombing of Army Task Force Operational， Police Headquarters and other government buildings in Damaturu， Yobe State and Maiduguri in Borno State. Christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla near Abuja （25 December 2011）. Mubi， Yola， Gombe and Maiduguri bombings （5-6 January 2012）. Kano bombings （20 January and 1 February 2012）. HQ 1 Division Nigerian Army and Kawo bridge bombings in Kaduna （7 February 2012）. The list is endless.

Most of these bombings have been attributed to the Boko Haram； a group that emerged out of the “Taliban” founded by Mohammed Yusuf （a Kanuri） as Yusufiya Islamiya Group between 2001 and 2002. Between this period， an Islamic religious complex that included a mosque and a school were established in Maiduguri. In 2002 the complex were relocated to Yusuf’s home state of Yobe in the village Kanamma near the Republic of Niger border. The group first became known internationally following the 2009 sectarian violence when several sect members were arrested by the police， which included Mohammed Yusuf the leader. Yusuf was later killed by the police of whom international and local Human Rights Organizations and Civil Society Groups unequivocally condemned as “Extra-judicial” killing. However， in recent times international news reports have argue that Boko Haram appears to have links to international terror organizations in Somalia， North Africa and the Al-Qaeda terror groups.

3. THEORIES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

Theories for understanding terrorism in Nigeria points towards a more historically-rooted and locally-specific account that examines how “greed”， “grievance” and psychological factors have combined in processes of terrorism. Granted that Islam is a religion of peace however， this paper hypothetically asks that： Are there any socio-psychological factors that predispose Muslim youth to act of terrorism？ Why are youth generally （whether Christian or Muslim） proportionally involved as both perpetrators and victims of violence in Nigeria？ The following theoretical paradigms are posited aimed at addressing the hypothetical questions thereof.

3.1 ‘Greed’ or opportunity perspective

This theoretical assumption typically sees armed violence （including terrorism） as the outcome of rational individual choices to maximise economic， social or political benefits. Rebellion is only feasible when the opportunity and potential gain from joining an armed group outweigh the benefits of not fighting and pursuing alternative income-generation opportunities （Urdal， 2007）. From this perspective， the costs of organising rebellion are lower where there is a large youth population （which is relatively cheap to recruit）， where there are high levels of poverty and illiteracy or where there is an abundance of easily lootable resources （Collier and Hoeffler， 2004）. Suffice to say that these identified variables abound in Nigeria and could perhaps explains why some Nigerian youth are more inclined to armed violence in contemporary times.

3.2 'Grievance’ perspective

Stewart （2008） argues that there is a link between horizontal inequalities and armed violence. Walton （2010） also sees armed violence （including terrorism） as a response to relative deprivation or exclusion. This theory supports the findings of Omale （2012） which argues that many people in Nigeria call for the restorative justice paradigm because they are ‘aggrieved and hurt’ socially， politically and economically； and could not explain why ‘a people who stand in plenty of water should wash their hands with spittle’. Similarly， the grievance theory appears to support the assumption of some people in Nigeria， that the violent dimension of Boko Haram is a reaction to job creation opportunities granted to the Niger Delta militants in the Amnesty Programme. For this reason， the unemployed youth in the north are aggrieved and want to benefit from same. This paper however argues that where the Boko Haram members missed their mark is from their name ‘Boko Haram’ （western education is evil）. How do they intend to benefit from international and local trainings like the Niger Delta militants when their supposed ideology already defines western education as evil？

Another “grievance hypothesis” that this paper argues is that modern Nigerian youths are becoming politically conscious and aware of their political right which have been constitutionally disfranchised. Unlike Uganda where a 19 years old girl won election into the National Parliament in 2012， section 65 ss （a） and （b） of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states otherwise that ‘a person shall be qualified for election to the National Assembly if he has attained the ages of thirty five years （for the Senate） and thirty years （for the House of Representative）. These constitutional provisions automatically disqualified potential youths electable into the National Assembly. By implication therefore， Nigerian youths are only good to be used as thugs and dumped by politicians but not as electable politicians themselves. Such political attitude can fuel a militarized sense of “we will do it ourselves” when provoked by the failure of government to provide for them in the mist of plenty.

This theoretical discourse is relevant to Nigeria where people already feel that our democracy is anorexic （people do not feel the dividends of democracy） or as the Governor of Imo State-Chief Rochas Okorocha put it： Nigeria’s democracy is suffering from “democratic kwashiorkism” （a situation where power is concentrated at the top and the head feeds fat while the lower extremities are extremely malnourished）.

3.3 Psychological propensity perspective

Walton （2010， p.3） emphasizes particular psychological reasons why young people are more prone to engaging in violence. He argues that adolescents may be more susceptible to recruitment by rebel groups or to engage in violence for a number of psychological reasons （emotional development or identity construction， for example）. Understanding this perspective is relevant in the Nigerian context where youths mirror their personality in the likeness of military rulers that dominated the political system of Nigeria until 1999. Hence it is not uncommon to hear or see idle Nigerian youth talk and behave violently in certain cases as if violence pays. Walton （2010） therefore argues that job creation schemes can provide restless youth with a means of channeling their energies and thereby resisting a natural propensity to violence in its various forms. This perspective however does not intend to overstate the threat posed by youth and neglecting the positive peacebuilding roles that youth could play if given the opportunity.

3.4 Social and political exclusionism perspective

This perspective sees youth violence as a product of the social and political marginalisation of young people. As Hilker and Fraser （2009， p.18） have argued， there is a growing sense in the literature that ‘the social and economic statuses required for adulthood are increasingly unattainable for young people’. Walton （2010） argues that a number of ethnographic studies of young people in a number of different conflict-affected countries have identified various social， economic and political barriers that block young peoples’ transition to adulthood， and highlighted the central role these barriers can play in driving violent conflict. For instance， Sommers’ （2006a） work on ‘youthmen’ in Rwanda and on blocked youth transitions in West Africa （Sommers， 2007）， research on ‘waithood’ in the Middle East （Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008）， and studies of youth violence in Sri Lanka （Amarasuriya et al， 2009） all emphasize a blocked transition to adulthood emerging as a result of a complex combination of demographic， economic， social and political factors. A related theme， which has been noted in a range of contexts， is corruption or hypocrisy of the political elite （Sommers， 2009； Amarasuriya et al， 2009， Yousuf， 2003）. Hence Yousuf （2003， p.19） has argued that， the fact that resources are controlled by entrenched elites rather than poverty and inequality per se is what drive youth grievance in recent times. So taking up arms against the state or the political elite in these contexts can provide a means by which they can integrate into society （by fire， by force）， or gain the sense of purpose and recognition denied them by the society （Sommers， 2007， p.9）. From this perspective， youth job creation will not address violence unless it also deals with the social and political exclusionism that underpins youth grievance. This is why there is no escaping the fact that terrorist attacks have almost exclusively been led and executed by young men. Males isolated from the rest of society.

4. COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES FOR NIGERIA

Given the complexity of the security situation in Nigeria， blended with the economic， political and social strife， projects and programmes designed to counter terrorism should be build around community resil?ience against terrorism， enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthening judicial institutions. Hence strategy and the impor?tance of collective efforts to counter terrorism in an increasingly interdepend?ent and interconnected Nigeria have become imperative. This paper highlights some measures that could be used to counter terrorism in Nigeria. Each of these initiatives targets a different aspect of what Piombo （2007） calls the four “Ds” of fighting terrorism： ‘Defeat terrorists and their organizations； Deny sponsorship， support and sanctuary to terrorists； Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit， and Defend citizens and interests at home and abroad’. Another way to consider these programmes’ effectiveness is that they should attempt to fight the supply of terrorists， the demand for terrorist networks， and the ability of terrorist to operate and maneuver. The counter terrorism measures proposed in this paper include the following：

4.1 The Meghalaya Model

The Meghalaya model is a multi-sector approach involving government， law enforcement， judiciary and civil society organizations that creates a comprehensive framework for combating trafficking in North East Asia in 1999 under the five “Ps” Prevention， Protection， Policing， Press and Prosecution （Kharbhih， 2010）. Meghalaya Model is designed to track and rescue trafficked children in North East Asia； to facilitate rehabilitation， and making sure that survivors do not get re-trafficked. It also provides families with livelihood alternatives； provides evidence to prosecute offenders； and raises awareness through the media. The process of Meghalaya Model is the five “Rs” Reporting， Rescue， Rehabilitation， Repatriation and Re-education. This paper believe that these activities that are pillars of the Meghalaya model to counter human trafficking are relevant to counter terrorism as they could fight the supply of terrorists， supply of mercenaries for terrorism， and the demand for terrorist networks. This is imperative because， despite international agreements and a plethora of national laws on counter terrorism， the issue remains one of the fastest growing criminal violence in the world. Its proliferation is due to its cross border nature and thus requires cooperation and collaboration between states， if it is to be tackled effectively. However， throughout the world often counter terrorism initiatives have failed to incorporate all relevant stakeholders. Hence， the Meghalaya Model though originally designed to track and rescue trafficked children could be adopted or adapted to counter terrorism in Nigeria； as there are insinuations of mercenaries and conscripted fighters for Boko Haram terrorists. And with the porous nature of Nigerian borders and the rate of human trafficking in the country， these mercenaries and conscripted fighters could be trafficked victims from neigbouring countries.

This model is relevant to counter terrorism in Nigeria because through a collaborative and far-reaching security network of stakeholders in counter terrorism and human trafficking （Security and Intelligence Agencies， NAPTIP， the media， Civil Society and NGOs）， terrorists， mercenaries and terror suspects are more likely to be arrested， and will face prosecution.

4.2 Countering Terrorism through Public Private Partnerships （CTPPP）

Closely related to the Meghalaya model is the CTPPP model. While combating terrorism is a primary responsibility of nation States， devel?oping partnerships with the private sector can be beneficial especially in areas where State resources and exper?tise are limited. The public-private partnerships （PPPs） concept is gaining attention in the business world， but at a much slower pace in the security domain. For instance Jonathan Lucas， Director of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute （UNICRI） argues that progress to build partnerships on security matters has been hampered by lack of legislation to facilitate information exchange between the public and private sectors， as well as the absence of incen?tives because ‘too often no incentives are pro?vided to encourage the private sector to invest in the protection of vulnerable tar?gets as the private sector usually considers funding of PPP initiatives in security sectors as a cost rather than an investment’ （2012， p.8）. However， the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy explicitly encourages such partnerships in capac?ity-building and information exchange. Hence the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force （CTITF） working group on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes argues how it benefited from private sector expertise in ‘the technical and legal aspects on how the Internet could be used to counter ter?rorist narratives’ （2012， p.8）. Russia for example， has been engaging with Moscow State Uni?versity and People’s Friendship Univer?sity of Russia to exchange new ideas and expertise in countering terrorism. Because in their view， ‘private-public coop?eration should not be limited to the business community alone but should also include non-governmental organiza?tions， media， tourism and hotels， youth associations， aca?demic community and religious lead?ers’ involvement in security sector’ （Yudintsev， 2012， p.8）.

4.3 Empowering Youth as Peace-Entrepreneurs and Peace-Seeds

There is growing evidence from the social science literature on the links between youth unemployment and armed conflict （Collier， 2003）， and donors have increasingly used youth job creation programmes as a tool with which to address armed violence. Many donors now identify addressing youth unemployment as an urgent priority， both in the field of peacebuilding and in efforts to foster economic development （World Bank， 2008； ILO， 2010； UN， 2009）. Similarly， the link between job creation and peacebuilding has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General’s approval of the ‘UN Policy For Post-Conflict Employment Creation， Income Generation And Reintegration’ in 2008 and more recently by the ILO’s 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict （UN， 2009； ILO， 2010）.

However， a study conducted by Walton （2010） finds that both the theoretical and the empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a ‘stand-alone’ tool for reducing violent conflict are extremely weak， because donor interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence of success is usually limited to demonstrating increases in employment levels， with little effort made to assess the impact on conflict. Hence， this paper argues that the evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive armed conflict or Anti Violence Response （AVR） strategy is stronger： some government-led initiatives in countries that experience high levels of armed violence （such as Brazil and South Africa） are good examples. So emphasis on youth Anti Violence Response （AVR） strategy should be based on ‘holistic’， ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ approaches that go beyond simply addressing a lack of economic opportunities， but seek to address the more complex array of factors （like belief system， religious， political and ethnic fundamentalism） that make youth entrepreneurs of violence rather than peace-seeds. This is imperative because Omale （2012） argues that， if youth involvement in terrorism is becoming a real threat， then the primary step is to try to understand the phenomena of increase， and the causes of such criminal deviance. Because in the word of Socrates ‘Fundamentum Omnius Cultus animae’ （i.e. the soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul）. For instance， the goal of most national educational curriculum in modern times is to produce scientists， lawyers， doctors， engineers， among other professionals for the society. How much of our school curriculum inculcate active citizenship education， youth leadership skills， civil courtesies and speaking for relationship buildings？ The earlier we begin to instill the skills of ‘Learning to Live Together’ （Oshita， 2005）， respect for humanity and society through active citizenship education the better for our society.

4.4 Women-Gender Intelligence （WGI）

This paper argues that the innovation of “Women-Gender Intelligence” （WGI） particularly in the events of volatile conflict and endemic suicide bombings in Nigeria has become imperative. For instance， with the continued violent conflict in Jos， and the emerging suicide bombings in the country， the “Women for Change and Development Initiative” of the Office of the First Lady of Nigeria orchestrated media campaigns and jingles of “Women： See Something； Say Something！”； “The One that give life must Protect Life！”

The impact of these jingles and campaigns； this author would argue motivated a rural woman in a village called Haya Biu， Niger State to assist the State Security Service in Nigeria to unravel the hideout of some Boko Haram extremists on 6th September， 2011 whom until then have been hiding there and making IEDs. By this revelation， it could be argued that women can be strong agents of change and development if adequately harnessed. In terms of security and counter terrorism in Nigeria， this paper argues that if women voluntarily and unanimously agree to stop insecurity， they can； because， there is no terrorist or criminal that does not have a mother， a spouse， or a girlfriend. The Women Gender Intelligence （WGI） is even more relevant in the Nigerian context since it is insinuated that some Boko Haram perpetrators are youth who cannot afford to pay bride price for a wife； and are so brain-washed and recruited to kill so as to be rewarded with seven virgins in Aljena. In this case therefore， if women are granted protection as whistle blowers， they can be good source of intelligence on counter terrorism in Nigeria.

4.5 Counter Extremism and De-radicalisation Programmes （CEDP）

Religion and cultural differences are among the most important causes of conflicts and violence in Nigeria. A very worrisome dimension of the role of religion in conflicts is the tendency and frequency at which some politicians and leaders exploit it for selfish reasons， as sometimes public statements on issues of religion tend to ignite or exacerbate conflicts， justifying the need for conflict sensitivity. Our world-as an American sociologist Peter Berger notes-is ‘fiercely religious’ and Nigeria has witnessed rising essentialism within all the major religions. For instance， a Muslim cleric was once criticised by the media for publicly preaching to his followers in a mosque in Kano （northern Nigeria） that “Un ka kama Mary ko Chinyere ka chisu” （meaning “if you catch a girl with a name Mary or Chinyere rape her”. This is a hate-based preaching that encourages young Muslims boys to rape girls bearing Christian or South Eastern names in Nigeria.

In the same vein， some Neo-Pentecostal and evangelical Christians in Nigeria see themselves （the “born again” brethren） as holier than the ‘Other’. Similarly， crusades that dwell much more on the Biblical verse of Mathew 11： 12 which states： “And from the days of John the Baptist until now， the kingdom of heaven suffered violence， and the violent takes it by force” are becoming common citations among youth in Nigeria. Whereas， this Biblical injunction does not encourages violence， perverse interpretations of these religious injunctions however have crept into the minds of some people. This radical mindset has created many of the world’s violent outbreaks， both present and past. Lammy （2013） argues in an article written after the May 22nd killing of a Woolwich soldier by a terrorist suspect （Michael Adebolajo） that ‘radical Islamism suffocates conventional Islamic beliefs with a diet of anger， hate and intolerance among young men， who perhaps are already convinced of being outcasts， and are intoxicated by teachings that not only entrench this difference further but demands that they despise the society they leave behind’. Hence， it is not uncommon for fringe groups of all ideological persuasions to systematically target these men by manipulating their sense of hopelessness and lack of belonging （Lammy， 2013）.

However， if religion could be used to cause conflict it could be used to resolve conflict. Because even in this climate of global religious turbulence， religions offer the potential for generosity， wisdom and an ethical sense of transcendence capable of creating a strong link between people， beyond their differences. People might have different beliefs and dogmas and adhere to different schools of philosophical and metaphysical thought， but this paper strongly believe that it is possible to share a pragmatic universal system of ethics that would allow us all to live together. So Counter Extremism and De-radi?calization Programmes （CEDP） can work， and could be an effective way of countering the spread of radical-violent ideology and activism， provided that the right condi?tions for success exist. These include， among others， political will， a vibrant civil society， a robust developmental and political capacity within the Nigeria State.

4.6 Security Inter-Operability （SIO）

In every human society there are those that could not be safely contained in the community. Security inter-operability that encourages security networking and intelligence sharing could root out the bad eggs in the society. For instance， if the police， SSS， EFCC and NIA work collaboratively they could unravel both local and international sponsors and financiers of Boko Haram. Similarly， if the Customs， Immigration and the NDLEA work collaboratively they could unravel the criminal importation of foreign mercenaries， drugs， arms and ammunitions that are sustaining the Boko Haram insurgencies. In the same vein， the SSS and police working collaboratively with the Prisons Service could plant pseudo inmates who are fluent in Arabic， Hausa， Fulani and Kanuri in strategic prison cells for intelligence gatherings from detained Boko Haram suspects. The Military Joint Task Forces （JMTF） could as well invest in telemetric security and cable detection technology； and use less of road blocks. Where these security strategies are done well， the use of the Military Joint Task Forces （MJTF） fire operations would only be the last resort. But if terror attacks do occur， a coordinated and well equipped MJTF that comprises the Military forces， NEMA， Fire Service and the Red Cross should be on a standby for effective evacuation and other needed humanitarian and relief services. However， in a system like Nigeria where security and law enforcement agencies struggle for supremacy and lay claim for arrests and security breakthroughs （as was the case in Kabiru Sokoto’s arrest）， inter-operability becomes difficult to achieve. Nigeria does not lack the institutions to counter terrorism but what Nigerian security and law enforcement agencies however need to understand is that “success for one is success for all”.

CONCLUSION

There is no escaping the fact that terrorist attacks globally have almost exclusively been led and executed by young men. Males isolated from the rest of society. Nigeria with its ready pools of unemployed labour， exploitative politicians， radical clerics； population prone to violence and weakened national and community cohesions， offers competitive advantage for militant and terrorist organizations， criminal networks and evil political leaders alike. Hence this paper agrees with Adams （2012） that chronic violence like Boko Haram insurgencies and the Niger Delta militancy is provoked and reproduced by diverse factors， many of them mutually interactive. These include new patterns of social inequality； disjunctive processes of democratisation； criminal networks and other adverse effects of globalization； and the perverse effects of the mass media. Babero （2002， p.27） argues that the mass media for instance play a central role in reproducing and amplifying violence， making fear ‘an elemental part of the new processes of communication’.

Similarly， the perceived gap between aspirations and livelihood options （relative deprivation） among Nigerian youth is repeatedly reported. Adams （2012） describes how many people in developing countries today see themselves as “social zeroes” or “second class citizens” or what Oputa （1975） calls “social death”-a situation which describes the experience of young men facing the absence of the possibility of a worthy life in contexts of chronic economic and social inequalities. When social circumstances degenerate to this level， youth are pushed to what Levi （1988， p.36） calls the “grey zone” - a central dynamic of life when people are dominated by chronic fear of the unknown. At this point， the differences between right and wrong， the innocent and the criminal， moral and immoral become blurred. This is why Nigerians have continued to ask： how can anyone become a suicide bomber for a pledge of cash or seven virgins？ As this paper has enunciated， we can see that it is not because of the cash or seven virgins per se. It is about the principles of justice and ideology the perpetrators believe in. Unfortunately， the person who is going to get bombed thinks it is unfair that they bomb him for committing no crime； the one who bombs thinks it is unfair that he doesn’t have a life to live for. This scenario depicts hopelessness and dearth of prudentialism； and is a big shift from the 1960s Nigeria， when developmentalist， progressive and revolutionary ideologies flourished in this predominantly rural continent and people contextualised their lives primarily within local and national realities.

Chronic violence such as terrorism therefore undermines social relations and provokes perverse social behaviour that is naturalized among vulnerable groups and becomes a perverse norm that can be transmitted intergenerational. It obstructs public engagement， endangers the practice of citizenship and weakens social support for democracy. Hence Adams （2012） argues that chronic violence like terrorism is unlikely to be easily reversed in the near term and therefore must be addressed as a long-term， perverse kind of “normality”. It must be addressed through intersectoral and interdisciplinary approaches， and stakeholders must engage in an unprecedented process of interdisciplinary and intersectoral learning， exchange and experimentation in order to construct effective approaches.

On this note， this paper argues in line with Adams （2012） that policy approaches or counter terrorism measures need to take into account the fact that chronic violence like terrorism is driven and reproduced by multiple drivers and affects wide ranging aspects of everyday life （from parent child relations to how people resolve conflicts with neighbours， practise religion， organise collectively and perceive their governments）. So， unilinear or mono-directional analyses and approaches to this problem are likely to continue to have little or limited utility.

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