Who Inspects the Inspectors?

It was recently reported that Wang Qishan， one of the seven members of the Standing Committee of the CPC Politburo， is a fan of the Netflix series House of Cards. Western media speculated that Wang’s fondness for the shows stems from its depiction of how Washington’s politics are routinely manipulated by abusive politicians.

However， observers point to what they see as Wang’s identification with lead character Frank Underwood， played by Kevin Spacey， a ruthless pragmatist adept at “whipping” his own party into submission.

At the end of 2012， the CPC Central Committee issued what it called its “Eight Rules” a new campaign to build clean government. Since then， a number of white papers and official actions have claimed to boost scrutiny of officials’ private assets from their cars to the contents of their shopping carts as well as how China’s leaders make use of their office hours and their downtime.

At a press conference in January 2014， the CPC’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection （CCDI）， the body headed by Wang Qishan， declared that by 2013， 30，420 officials had been found “in violation” of the Eight Rules， including some officials within the CCDI itself.

In 2013， 32 “typical examples” of these violations were published by the Commission， mainly involving officials from the village to the provincial level using public funds for entertainment and tourism. In December， a list of names， including some ministerial-level figures， was published.

A number of ministries and local governments responded with their own name-and-shame lists. As a result， total expenditure on official receptions held by departments and offices directly under the central government in 2013 was less than half the figure recorded in 2012 according to the Commission’s website， though verifiable data are impossible to obtain. Nevertheless， the CCDI has announced more inspections in more government agencies and State-owned enterprises this year than in previous years.

In other words， the Party is still placing its faith in self-policing as an effective method to foster good behavior in its ranks.

Party Detectives

Many of the allegations resulting from these disciplinary actions look almost deliberately salacious， and State media reports are typically backed up with simple statements of guilt and blurry video footage.

For example， an official who was allegedly caught surfing pornographic websites during office hours found himself the subject of a prime time exposé on State-run China Central Television （CCTV） on April 11， 2013. He lost his job head of a township discipline inspection bureau in Hunan Province shortly afterward.

On February 17， 2014， videos of several government officials and their staff members in Hubei Province shopping or playing online games in their offices were also broadcast on CCTV. One of them， Zhou Ziyi， the county’s deputy statistics director， had previously appeared on TV claiming that he was so busy that he “didn’t have time to worry about inspections.”

Unannounced inspections by Party agents are increasingly used as part of the Eight Rules campaign. According to the paper under the CCDI， discipline officials in Changshu city， Jiangsu Province， scanned parking spaces around the town’s most extravagant karaoke parlor in search of government vehicles in June 2013. Mouthpiece of the Chongqing municipal government the Chongqing Daily has detailed a number of cases where wayward officials have been netted “by chance.” In February， for example， discipline investigators stopped government cars at freeway on- and off-ramps to check if they were carrying contraband luxury liquor to banquets. Others demanded that five-star hotels in minor cities disclose details of all banqueting reservations.

In August 2013， Yueyang became the first city in Hunan Province to install its own GPS system designed to monitor the movements of more than 4，000 government autos round-the-clock. Illegally parked vehicles trigger a warning in a government monitoring center which can then relay a signal to the car’s onboard computer， cutting off the fuel line.

Other frequently used techniques are sting operations which en-list the help of members of the public. In Tianjin municipality， for example， about 1，000 doctors， teachers， lawyers and even college students volunteered in 2013 to “test” government hotlines and public service bureaus， specially those charged with taxation and business registration. A sweeping crackdown on agencies that were allowing telephones to ring unanswered or providing poor service followed soon after.

Watch the Watchdog

At the conference on March 15， Wang Qishan asked CCDI inspectors to “keep their eyes wide open.” During its Third Plenum in November 2013， the CPC Central Committee decided to reduce the intervention of local Party agencies in investigations into discipline violations， with central officials increasingly in the driving seat. This has moved responsibility for prosecuting corrupt or abusive officials everhigher up the political food chain. While effective in terms of forcing local authorities to surrender control of their own investigations， this tactic also makes it virtually impossible to scrutinize top-level officials， meaning that generally， the higher an official’s rank， the safer they are likely to be. Consequently， violations become more severe the higher they go up the food chain.

The secretive operations of the Party’s internal discipline wing may be more visible than ever， yet they remain far from transparent， particularly at higher levels. The CCDI’s official web site， launched in September 2013， publicized selective information on the organizational structure and procedures followed by the agency. Some senior officials gave interviews to the website， which also published the names of officials under investigation， what they were charged with， and their punishments， if any.

However， some observers claim that such nods to transparency simply further cloud the public’s vision， and serve to replace one smokescreen with simply a more sophisticated one.

The specific powers wielded by the CCDI itself， for example， have never been fully clarified to the public. Huang Shuxian， deputy secretary of the Commission disclosed at a press conference in January that provincial offices only assigned 22 percent of their human resources to dealing with specific cases. Therefore， as stated in an article written in February by Hou Chang’an， Hubei’s provincial head of discipline inspection， officials should “focus on their own responsibilities，” rather than be assigned to “irrelevant tasks.”

The backgrounds of the inspectors themselves are also regularly called into question. In 2013， several local discipline inspection officials were arrested for taking massive bribes. The CCDI website reported that it would establish a separate wing to investigate investigators， leading many to speculate just how deep this rabbit hole would go. In addition， the deaths of several local officials while in CCDI custody in 2013 have raised concerns about the use of torture and even extralegal executions during closed-door interrogations.

Progress on establishing genuine transparency in CCDI operations has been slow. For example， while many argue that the full declaration of officials’ private assets is crucial to establishing clean government， these calls have been roundly rejected by almost all Party agencies. Genuinely public surveillance or the use of NGO watchdogs as alternatives to self-policing have similarly been viewed with contempt by Party officials and the State media.

For now， the Party is asking the public to continue to have faith in its ability to regulate its own behavior. How much of this faith still remains， however， is anyone’s guess.