The Science of Symbolism

When the meeting between Chi- nese President Xi Jinping and Taiwanese leader Ma Yingjeou， held in Singapore this November， was first announced， the news left observers reeling.

The brief summit marked the first-ever meeting between leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949， which resulted in the retreat of the Kuomintang （KMT） government of the Republic of China （ROC） to the island， as the victorious Communists declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China （PRC） on the mainland.

After decades of animosity， the two sides began to engage in indirect talks in the early 1990s through mediated meetings between the mainland-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits （ARATS） and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation（SEF）.

In 2005， China’s then President Hu Jintao met with KMT chairman Lien Chan， marking the beginning of party-to-party talks between the two sides， though the KMT was in opposition at the time.

Since Ma assumed power in 2008， the cross-Strait relationship has further deepened， but top leaders had never met due to numerous issues of logistics and protocol ranging from terms of address to where such a meeting should be held.

Protocol

As Beijing does not recognize the ROC government， it also does not acknowledge Ma as either a head of state or a head of government. Therefore， to meet with Ma， Beijing had to choose between acknowledging him either in a personal capacity or as the leader of the KMT， an arrangement unacceptable to Taipei.

In addition， due to its insistence that the cross-Strait relationship is a “domestic” issue， Beijing had also opposed holding any meeting in a third-party country. Taiwan’s preference， meanwhile， was for a meeting on the sidelines of a separate international event， or on unequivocally foreign soil， in order to avoid its leader appearing to “kowtow” to Beijing.

Prior to the November summit， the closest the two men got to a meeting was in 2014， when Ma openly proposed a meeting with Xi during the APEC summit in Beijing that October in the capacity of “leaders of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait” rather than “two presidents.”

When Beijing rejected this offer， the prospects for a summit between Xi and Ma dimmed to the point of being viewed as next to impossible. It surprised observers， therefore， when both sides appeared to brush aside logistical problems and questions of protocol within the space of a year.

In November， Xi and Ma indeed met in the capacity of “leaders of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait，” apparently a change of heart on the part of Beijing. Both men addressed one another as “mister.” To avoid the perception that one side was “hosting” the other， and thereby creating the impression of unequal status， it was reported that Ma and Xi split the cost of both their dinner and the rental of the meeting venue.

The selection of Singapore as the location for the leaders’ summit was also a shrewd one. Singapore was previously the venue for a similarly historic meeting between ARATS head Wang Daohan and SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu in 1993. While holding the summit in a foreign jurisdiction met Taiwan’s bottom-line demand for “equality and dignity，”Singapore’s large ethnic Chinese population and close relationship with Beijing allowed the PRC to avoid being seen as having made major concessions. State media on the mainland in fact likened the summit to “a meeting between two brothers” held “in the home of a distant cousin.”

Influence

While the unprecedented and suddenly announced meeting disoriented observers， the fact that the two sides explicitly announced prior to meeting that they would not sign any agreement or release a joint statement has led many to conclude that the event was more about symbolism than substance.

To critics， the timing of the summit C two months ahead of Taiwan’s general electionC was designed to influence the island’s politics. Leading candidate Tsai Ing-wen， chairwoman of the opposition pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party （DPP）， for example， accused the KMT of trying to “politically manipulate” cross-Strait relations and influence the outcome of the election.

However， few analysts believe that the summit will have a major impact on Tsai’s double-digit lead in the polls， even though it may sway some voters one way or the other. According to data released by Taiwan Indicator Survey Research on November 12， while the approval rating of the KMT’s Eric Chu increased from 16.4 percent to 20.4 percent after the summit， Tsai’s approval rating has remained robust at 46.2 percent， with James Soong of the People First Party trailing in third place with 10.4 percent.

Five-Point Plan

However， given the importance of crossStrait issues in Taiwanese politics， the election was no doubt a major consideration in arranging the historic meeting. For Ma in particular， a summit with Xi can serve multiple goals. Not only does it have the potential to enrich his political legacy， but it might also provide a chance to regroup the fractured KMT， which has been left in disarray by partisan internal struggles.

Just two weeks prior to the meeting， the KMT decided to replace Hung Hsiu-chu， an openly pro-unification candidate， with the less-controversial Eric Chu， the centrist chairman of the KMT. Hung’s campaign pledge that she would work to sign a peace treaty and achieve “ultimate unification” with the mainland alienated many centrist supporters of the KMT and a broad swath of Taiwan’s electorate that， according to polling data， consistently favors the “status quo.”

As Hung remained defiant， stressing that her policy was in line with the ROC constitution and the KMT’s long-held official stance on cross-Strait relations， her eventual replacement has not only enraged the prounification faction within the KMT， but has spread confusion over both the party’s overall mainland policy and its stance on the legacy of the ROC.

The summit provided a rare chance for Ma to address these issues and systematically reiterate the KMT’s vision regarding cross-Strait relations. In his speech， Ma stressed the progress made under his administration over the past seven years， including the signing of 23 agreements made between the two sides. Ma also offered a five-point plan for maintaining“peace and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait.” Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou meet at the ShangriLa Hotel， Singapore， November 7， 2015

Ma stressed the importance of solidifying the so-called 1992 Consensus for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Considered by Beijing as its "bottom-line" position on cross-Strait policy， the 1992 Consensus refers to an agreement reached between the KMT and Beijing in which both sides agreed that there is “One China，”while strategically accepting some ambiguity over the concept’s precise definition.

As the DPP’s position has been that such an agreement does not exist， Tsai Ing-wen has avoided discussing the issue in the run-up to Taiwan’s general election. While pledging that she will uphold the outcomes of earlier negotiations between Taipei and Beijing， she has refused to clarify whether she will explicitly acknowledge the 1992 Consensus.

Analysts believe that the summit may help Ma to shift the focus of the election back onto the cross-Strait relationship， and make the KMT look like the better choice to handle relations with the mainland. While Tsai’s election victory may now be a foregone conclusion， the KMT might still be able to avert a DPP landslide in the upcoming legislative election that would be held at the same time.

In his speech in Singapore， Ma said that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should reduce hostilities and peacefully handle disputes， a swipe at Beijing’s refusal to renounce force as a means to reunify Taiwan， which the mainland views as a breakaway province. Ma also made reference to missile arrays deployed along China’s southern coast， arrays which Xi declared “did not target Taiwan.”

Ma’s third and fourth recommendations were to broaden trade and business exchanges between the two sides， and establish a cross-Strait hotline between senior officials of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan and the Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing to avoid“misunderstandings.”

His final point focused on cultural and ethnic ties， and Ma quoted from various Chinese literary classics seemingly in a nod to Xi’s “one-family” idea. Ma said that both sides should cooperate to “revitalize” the Chinese nation， a concept first raised by ROC founding father Sun Yat-sen a century ago from which Xi has derived his similar concept of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

By re-emphasizing Sun’s political legacy， Ma appeared to be trying to reiterate the KMT’s commitment to the ROC constitution and reassert his party’s basic political doctrine， underlining KMT policy on crossStrait relations.

Last Warning

Compared to Ma’s complex goals， Xi’s remarks in Singapore were more straightforward. Beijing appears to be looking beyond the election， towards an administration almost certainly headed by Tsai Ing-wen and the pro-independence DPP .

Like Ma， Xi re-emphasized the significance of upholding the 1992 Consensus in his speech， albeit in tougher language. Echoing Ma’s remarks that the Consensus forms the“common political ground” of the peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship， Xi warned that “the boat of peaceful development may encounter terrifying waves or even capsize，” phrases that have been repeatedly used by mainland officials in recent months. A group of mainland and Taiwanese students attend the inaugural cross-Strait coming-of-age ceremony， Jinmen， October 3， 2015

But， in the meantime， Xi also suggested that Beijing would be willing to engage in talks with the DPP if the latter would accept the 1992 Consensus. “Regardless of which party or organization [leads Taiwan]， and regardless of their positions in the past， as long as the 1992 Consensus and its core values are acknowledged， we are ready to have contact，”said Xi.

So far， there has been no official contact between Beijing and the DPP . The former refuses to officially engage with any organization that endorses the concept of Taiwanese independence， while the latter has ruled out accepting any “political preconditions” before engaging in direct talks.

Xi also said that China would welcome Taiwan to join the Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB） under “an appropriate name.” Beijing rejected Taipei’s bid to become a founding member of the AIIB earlier this year， presumably because of the nomenclature Taiwan used on its application. Therefore， these remarks were seen as being directed at the island’s future leader.

According to Professor Zheng Yongnian， director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore， the significance of the summit between Xi and Ma is in its “new possibilities” reflecting “new imagination” in the future of the cross-Strait relationship.

“It set up a new platform， that is direct meetings between leaders of the two sides based on the 1992 Consensus，” Zheng told NewsChina. In his view， if such meetings become regular， they could potentially translate into concrete results， bringing enduring peace and stability to the Taiwan Strait.

By offering a potential olive branch to the DPP leader， and at the same time reiterating its non-negotiable One China principle， Beijing has raised the stakes for Tsai as a potential future leader， leaving her with less room for ambiguity should she be elected.

From this perspective， the significance of the summit between Xi and Ma will only be revealed after Taiwan goes to the polls.