China’s Greatest Challenge?

During the week-long Zhuhai Air Show， held mere days after the 18th Party Congress that unveiled the country’s new leadership， China presented an array of sophisticated new homegrown weaponry， including attack helicopters， unmanned aerial vehicles and surface-to-air missiles， as well as a quarter-scale model of China’s second stealth fighter， commonly referred to as the J-31.

Also， on November 25， China conducted the first landing of the J-15 fighter on its brand- new and only aircraft carrier. Broadcast on State television， the landing was hailed as a major step toward the extension of China’s ability to project its military might.

Compared to the secretive test flight of the J-20， China’s first stealth fighter， during a visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in January， 2011， an action which led Gates to seek an explanation from Beijing， the recent public display of new weapon systems has been carried out in the open. Experts believe that this open-air approach to showcasing military technology is an indication of a more proactive stance in China’s future foreign and military policies.

From Economic to Security

According to Professor Yan Xuetong， director of the Institute of International Studies and editor-in-chief of the Chinese Journal of International Politics， the major feature of China’s new strategy in defense and foreign policy is the shift away from securing domestic economic growth toward safeguarding its overall strategic interests.

“China’s defense and military development must be oriented towards China’s national security needs， incorporating the need for economic development，” reads the Party’s influential work report， presented during the Party Congress in November， setting out the government’s policy direction for the next five years.

Since Reform and Opening-up in the 1980s， economic growth has been the priority of all government agencies， including those involved in defense and foreign policy. Following the doctrine of “keeping a low profile and biding one’s time” first touted by Deng Xiaoping， the architect of China’s reforms， the chief goal of China’s defense and foreign policy used to be“securing a peaceful international environment so that the country can focus on developing its economy.” In largely achieving this goal， China has previously refrained from asserting its sovereign claim over disputed territories， both land and sea territories， following Deng’s iconic principle of “putting disputes aside.”

Not any longer. As China has become the world’s second largest economy， complicating existing power relations and leading to anxiety over China’s regional role， keeping a low profile has ceased to be an option. China’s economic success has led to a surge in nationalism among its population， and the prioritization of commerce over strategic interests in foreign policy has come under withering attack from the general public， with some accusing the government of surrendering sovereignty for economic gains.

China’s leaders have also slowly been realizing that economic power alone does not automatically translate into strategic influence. While China is unquestionably the dominant economic force in East and Southeast Asia and the number one trading partner of all major players in the Asian-pacific region， including South Korea， Japan and most ASEAN countries， in terms of diplomacy， regional relationships and military strategy， China remains in the shadow of the US.

In recent years， China has been trying to woo its neighbors with commercial develop- ment， believing that economic integration and greater interdependence between China and other Asian countries would eventually lead the region towards the establishment of a regional free trade zone. However， sovereignty disputes in the South and East China seas have shown just how fragile this strategy is. Both disputes have soured political and economic ties， with many of China’s erstwhile partners strengthening their relationships with the US and freezing China out of regional decision making.

“China needs to make it clear that it is not an option for the surrounding countries to challenge China’s strategic interests while simultaneously benefiting from Chinese commerce，”commented Professor Wu Xinbo from Fudan University in an article published by the nationalist Global Times on November 10， 2012. Wu argues that economics will eventually become the means， rather than the ends， of China’s future regional strategy.

For Professor Yuan Peng， this strategic shift signals a move towards “a grander strategy，”incorporating defense， foreign and economic policy.

On November 30， Xi Jinping， the head of the Communist Party of China and presidentin-waiting， generalized this grander strategy in a nationally broadcast keynote speech as the“Chinese dream，” further defined as “the revival of the Chinese nation.” Xi’s ambiguous phrasing has been interpreted by analysts to signify a whole host of policy realignments， both internal and external， but most agree that a more assertive international strategy is already in place.

In early December， 2012， Hainan Province announced that Chinese ships would be allowed to “search and repel” foreign vessels“trespassing in Chinese waters.” In clarifying the new law， Wu Shicun， director general of the Foreign Affairs Office of Hainan Province said the rule only applies to ships that enter within the Chinese-imposed 12-nautical-mile exclusion zone surrounding disputed islands.

While these actions are widely viewed outside of China as aggressive， within China they are painted as legitimate responses to foreign provocations which have been emboldened by the US policy to “encircle and besiege” China. With both sides claiming moral authority and playing the victim card， it is increasingly difficult for compromise to be considered.

“The military dimensions of the US pivot toward Asia has the undesirable consequence of fueling Chinese perceptions of a deteriorating and more threatening regional strategic environment，” Sam Bateman， senior research fellow at the Maritime Security Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies， Nanyang Technological University， Singapore， told . President Barack Obama’s recent visits to Myanmar， Thailand， and Cambodia， the three Southeast Asian nations seen as most friendly to China， has further alarmed Beijing.

In response， China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie， met with Soe Win， deputy commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces and commander of the Myanmar Army on November 16 in Beijing， pledging to strengthen strategic communication between the two countries. On November 18 and 22， Premier Wen Jiabao paid his own visits to Cambodia and Thailand.

On November 29， the US Senate approved an amendment to Article 5 of the USJapan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to explicitly confirm that the disputed Diaoyu （Senkaku） Islands fall under Washington’s existing defensive pact with Japan， a move which immediately drew condemnation from China. On the anniversary of Rape of Nanking on December 13， China sent a surveillance plane over the islands， which Japan responded to send eight Japanese F-15 fighter jets to intercept it. Both sides accuse the other of escalating the dispute.

China’s perceived neutrality following the widely-condemned launch of a North Korean long-range rocket in December 2012 and Bei- jing’s ongoing support for the Kim regime is also a sticking point， fueling anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan and South Korea. Many international observers believe that both countries’ respective electorates could lurch to the right as a result， an outcome which would likely further strengthen US strategy and further isolate China.

At the same time， Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party， then frontrunner in the current electoral cycle， pledged to amend its pacifist constitution. After Shinzo Abe， the LDP’s center-right leader who has been called an apologist for Japanese militarism in World War II regained power， Chinese State media speculation about a “lurch to the right” in Japan reached fever pitch. In another development， the Philippines recently voiced support for Japanese re-armament - an unprecedented move by a country which suffered massively under the Japanese occupation during World War II.

Experts warn that the situation has now descended into uneasy “mutual threat perception，” with China on one side and the US and its allies on the other. This in turn has led to a cycle of tit-for-tat action and reaction， steadily escalating toward an indeterminate conclusion. This constitutes what Sam Bateman calls a “classic security dilemma，” which， if not controlled through more focused and less prejudiced strategic dialogue， may spiral into a regional arms race， if not open conflict.