贸易性洗钱

转运可以增加海运的效率，但这种贸易方式也有缺陷，其中之一是增加了贸易性洗钱（TBML）的可能性。根据2009年美国国务院的《国际管制策略报告》，每年国际贸易中都隐藏了价值数十亿美元的洗钱活动。

贸易性洗钱是洗钱的三大途径之一，其他两种是金融性洗钱、现金走私。TBML的形式多种多样，一般会通过操纵货物价格、数量、质量或货物分类扭曲货物账面价值，从而使进口商和出口商得以在国际间转移大量资金且不留存交易记录。价格操纵是最简单的贸易性洗钱方式，但此做法也可与其他方式相结合。

世界海关组织提出了一系列解决供应链安全的准则，这有助于发现、阻截贸易性洗钱活动。2005年《促进全球贸易安全和便利标准框架》（2007年修订）建议采取措施，在多个方面协调海关监管，包括建立公共数据交换标准、信息和通信技术指南以及风险评估标准。同年，166个成员国家和地区一致通过了该框架。

反洗钱管理存在众多难题，其一就是区分相关和非相关信息。要想从数量巨大的合法交易中识别出占比极小的非法交易，必须做到明察秋毫，而建立国家级的金融情报组织，收集可疑交易情报，将有助于有效识别洗钱行为。此外，由于非法资金可以通过国际金融系统在不同区域内频繁流动，洗钱已经成了一种国际性问题，也正因为如此，各国金融情报组织、金融区域性机构已经形成了信息共享的合作框架。

但这些方法还不足以抑制贸易性洗钱活动。大量与贸易相关的货币交易通过财政部门无法监管的途径和手段进行，由此产生的洗钱行为也是政府部门所无法侦查的。尽管相关信息可通过国际合作实现搜集、共享，但与密集的国际贸易相比，目前的国际合作十分有限。要想实现有效侦查，各国反洗钱部门需要交换进出口数据，以便获取较大规模的贸易信息群。信息需符合一定标准并统一格式，以便于分析。

转运枢纽能成为反洗钱管理的难题之一，主要原因是自由贸易区的存在。此类贸易区的政策规定较为宽松，对交易相关人的身份认证要求较少，现金交易等高风险行为也更容易被接受。这些宽松的政策影响了交易数据的获取和分析，并进而降低了贸易性洗钱监管的有效性。

自由贸易区转运的不透明性加大了目的港海关的风险，因为后者将很难识别货物的实际原产地。这个问题不仅体现在贸易性洗钱活动中，也体现在大规模杀伤性武器扩散、走私以及其他与贸易相关的犯罪行为中。在很多案例中，承运人更改原产地信息的现象都有发生。

由于洗钱活动中跨境资本流动频繁，因此政府间的合作将成为反洗钱管理的重点，而海关之间的合作机制则是重点中的重点。在主要的转运枢纽建立透明化的贸易组织，将能为监管提供有价值的数据。如果将这些数据与原产地、目的地的数据进行对比，就能得到更多关于交易和运输路径的详细信息。

一些自由贸易协议要求：企业需提供证件，证明货物未在转运地得到任何改变。这种规定可以保证原产地规则的实施，但其对所提供的文件并未加以规范化，对所需的信息数量和种类也没有统一规定。如果能将此类证明推广成一般性的转运文件，管理方将因此得到另一种有价值的运输信息来源，而这些信息与进口端、出口端的信息具有明显的可比性。

通过政府间的多边探索，运用非强制性的“软法律”减少转运、贸易性洗钱活动的突发性，这种做法已经发挥了重要作用。“软法律”有效建立了行为规范，在政府和行业中对合规和违规行为进行了定义。这种方法有效地促成了一些标准，例如，在其推动下，世界海关组织建立了商品编码协调制度，并将其作为统一的货物认证规范体系。“软法律”将推动各国海关进一步开放管理，这有利于某国海关与他国海关实现贸易数据共享，同时也利于各方统一数据格式，方便数据共享和分析。

作者：Jasper Liao and Arabinda Acharya, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

来源：Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol.14, No.1, 2011

Trade-based Money Laundering

The use of transshipment has increased the efficiency of trans-ocean shipping. TBML is one of the three major categories of money laundering, along with finance-related money laundering, and cash smuggling. There are number of ways for TBML to take place. Generally, it involves manipulation of the stated price, quantity, quality, or type of goods shipped in order to distort the ostensible value of the shipment. This enables importers and exporters to move large amounts of money internationally without a transaction record. The process of price manipulation is TBML at its simplest, but this practice can also be integrated with other forms.

The WCO has come up with a set of standards addressing supply chain security that have implications in TBML detection and interdiction.

One of the many problems in the wider AML regime is the ratio of relevant information to irrelevant information. The ability to distinguish the tiny percentage of illicit money and transactions from the vast majority of legitimate transactions is dependent on getting information that is targeted to the purpose of finding anomalies.

However, these measures would not be sufficient to counter TBML activity, the vast majority of trade-related monetary transactions occurs through avenues not monitored by financial institutions. Relevant trade information is being gathered and shared， but the extent of these partnerships is still very limited, compared to the ubiquity of international trade. Effective detection would include an open exchange of trade data between AML authorities in jurisdictions on both the import and export side of a trade transaction in order for there to be a larger overall quantity of transaction information to analyze. The quality of information on receipt or analysis is also paramount: Information must also be in the right format, so that it can be easily analyzed if necessary.

The main reason transshipment hubs pose an AML threat is the presence of FTZs. There are less requirements in identifying individuals involved in transactions, and a more permissive atmosphere for high-risk behavior. These conditions can detract from effective TBML monitoring by impairing transaction data collection and analysis.

Opacity of transshipment activity through FTZs also increases the risk that Customs at the point of destination will not be able to identify the true origin . This problem is not confined to TBML, but also extends to threats like WMD proliferation, drug smuggling and other crimes involving trade. Instances of shippers altering origin information has been documented in a number of cases.

Because of the frequency of trans-border money movement in money laundering activity, cooperation between national authorities is a key factor in AML. As such, mechanisms for customs cooperation are extremely important. Establishing TTUs in jurisdictions with major transshipment hubs could also offer valuable data, Information collected from the transshipment hub could be compared with import and export information from the points of destination and origin, giving an even more detailed picture of transactions and the paths the shipments take.

One document required in some Free Trade Agreements is the Certificate of Non-Manipulation, which certifies that the items passing through the transshipment jurisdiction have not been altered in any way. This is a way to ensure that the rules of origin are respected. However, this document is not standardized, and there is much variation in the amount and types of information required.

Multilateral initiatives, through the use of non-binding “soft law” can also play a role in mitigating the emerging problems caused by transshipment and TBML as a whole.“Soft law” can be an effective way to establish behavior norms, defining what is deemed acceptable and unacceptable practice within industry and among governments. This approach is also an effective way to establish standards, as with the WCO's successful establishment of harmonized system codes as an international cargo identification norm. For the purposes of combating TBML, “soft law” could be utilized to prompt national Customs administrations to be more open about sharing trade data with other Customs jurisdictions, and also to keep that data in a common format that is easily shared and analyzed.