A Zero-Sum Game?

“The Pacific Ocean is large enough to accommodate both the US and China，”said Chinese President Xi Jinping during his California summit with US President Barack Obama， according to Chinese State media.

Contrary to expectations， however， China’s territorial dispute with Japan over the uninhabited Diaoyu island chain （known as the Senkaku in Japan） in the East China Sea， was not men- tioned in any press releases， indicating that both leaders are keen to keep this issue behind closed doors.

‘Core Interest？’

This might explain why when Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported that， according to Japanese officials， President Xi told Obama during the summit that the Diaoyu Islands were a“core interest” for China， it raised eyebrows on both sides.

If Beijing identifies the Diaoyu disputes as a“core interest，” a term reserved for sensitive policy areas such as Taiwan， Tibet and Xinjiang， it would mean that Beijing considers the issue one of preserving national integrity and thus nonnegotiable.

But the Japan Times later reported that Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary， Yoshihide Suga， had denied the report’s claims.

China’s State media， however， has been less than circumspect about labeling the Diaoyu Islands a “core interest.” An editorial published in 2012 in China’s flagship State newspaper and mouthpiece of the Communist Party the People’s Daily， explicitly called the islands China’s“core interest.” Hua Chunying， spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Ministry， also used the term regarding the islands dispute in a April press conference.

Senior officials， however， have ensured the term remains off the table. People’s Liberation Army Deputy Chief of General Staff Qi Jianguo said on June 3 at the 12th Asia Security Summit Shangri-La Dialog， held in Singapore， that China still adheres to the principle of “passing issues into posterity，” a typical example of the moderate path being trodden by China’s military when compared to an increasingly hawkish press.

The apparent discrepancy between Chinese official remarks about the importance of the islands and media hype may reflect the uncertainty or division among the Chinese leadership over its strategy in handling the Diaoyu dispute， which has the makings of a full-blown strategic confrontation as China continues to send its surveillance ships into disputed waters despite Japanese protests.

Charm Offensive

In recent months， Prime Minister Shinzo Abe， emboldened by high approval ratings at home and US assurances that the islands fall under the Japan-US mutual defense treaty， has launched a diplomatic offensive to counter Chinese global influence to the extent that many in China have described it as “encirclement.”

Following Xi’s high-profile visit to Russia in March during which China and Russia signed a wide range of agreements to forge what many Chinese， though few Russians， have termed a“quasi-alliance，” Abe paid a seven-day visit to Russia in early May. The first Japanese prime minister to visit Russia in ten years， this visit was interpreted as a further attempt to weaken China’s diplomatic standing by reaching out to former rivals.

“Even though Japan has not signed a peace treaty with Russia， beginning discussions on China would serve as a way of countering Beijing，” a high-ranking Japanese diplomat told the Asahi Shimbun.

Also， following Xi Jinping’s visit to Africa in late March and early April during which the Chinese president promised $20 billion in unconditional financial assistance to Africa in the next two years， Abe promised in a conference on African development held in Tokyo in late May that Japan would provide $32 billion in aid in the next five years， trumping China’s offer. Abe also stressed that Japanese projects in Africa would make use of local workforces， seen as an attack on China’s unpopular preference for using imported Chinese laborers in its African projects.

In late May， Abe visited Myanmar， promising to offer US$537 million in official development aid and writing off US$2 billion in debt. The first visit made to the country by a Japanese prime minister in 36 years， this was further grist to the Chinese media mill， as Myanmar has， since launching political reforms， drawn away from its traditional friendship with China and deepened cooperation with the West.

However， none of these actions by Abe have proven more unpalatable to the Chinese than Abe’s apparent questioning of Japan’s war record， long a point of contention between the country and its former occupied territories. During a session of the Japanese Diet in April， Abe was asked if he considered Japan’s wartime occupation of China to be an “invasion.” Abe’s evasive response， “The definition of what constitutes an‘invasion’ has yet to be established in academia or in the international community，” following this up with “things that happened between nations will look different depending on which side you view them from，” his remarks raised hackles throughout Asia.

On May 3， during a ceremony celebrating the anniversary of the day Japan regained sovereignty after its defeat in WWII， Abe further upset China after chanting “tenno heika banzai，”or “long live the emperor，” a phrase Japanese officials typically avoid using in public as it has overtones of wartime militarism.

Showdown

As a response， Chinese premier Li Keqiang warned that the world “should not allow anyone to destroy or deny the postwar peace” and that“any attempt to deny or glorify wartime aggression during those years are nothing less than a challenge to international justice established in the German city of Potsdam， site of the 1945 conference that helped define national boundaries after the Nazi defeat.”

Refraining from directly referring to the Diaoyu Islands， Li stressed that the Potsdam agreement reaffirmed Japan should return all territory seized from China， despite the questionable status of the Diaoyu Islands， which were occupied prior to Japan’s invasion of the Chinese mainland and thus not explicitly mentioned in Potsdam.

Indeed， besides resorting to moralizing and occasional patrols， China’s strategic options are rather limited.

Tokyo， under US security guarantees， can afford to concentrate its strategic resources on China， while Beijing is embroiled in a number of pressing strategic issues ranging from the South China Sea disputes to its tense relationship with major powers such as India and the US. The problem of an increasingly belligerent North Korea has also stretched China’s resources beyond usual limits.

In early May， the People’s Daily published an editorial questioning Japan’s sovereignty over the entire Ryukyu archipelago， which includes Okinawa， on the grounds that the islands were vassal states of China before Japan invaded and annexed the Kingdom of Okinawa in 1879. Employment of this questionable argument is seen as an attempt to counter Japan’s claims that the Diaoyu islands are a geographic part of the Ryukyu archipelago， and an example of how hawkish China’s State media has become on this particular issue.

On June 3， however， China’s People’s Liberation Army Deputy Chief of General Staff Qi Jianguo brushed the claim aside. Affirming that China does not dispute Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa， Qi said that “recent comments in Chinese newspapers merely reflect the views of some academics.”

To many Chinese， “biding one’s time” remains the best option for China. In an editorial published on May 30， nationalist newspaper Global Times argued that China “will eventually prevail over Japan” as a result of a shift in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

“It will take time for Japan to face the reality that the once sole great power in East Asia has to give way to China， whose GDP and maritime strength will surpass that of Japan，” ran the editorial.

However， such expectations are precisely why Japan seems to be consolidating its position in order to head off such a scenario. “The military balance between Japan and China will completely collapse in two years，” Abe recently told media， giving voice to public calls in Japan for full rearmament.

As China continues to patrol disputed territorial waters， Japan has now started to step up its reaction. On May 30， lawmakers from Abe’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party （LDP） called for a legal framework to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to launch a preemptive missile strike at enemy targets to prevent an imminent attack on Japan. This recommendation， unthinkable in the past， marks a major step towards amending Japan’s pacifist constitution， as Abe’s party pledged during his election campaign.

On June 14， citing Japanese sources， China’s State broadcaster China Central Television（CCTV） warned that Japan may “fire the first shot.” This was a response to the drafting of a law by the LDP which would authorize Japan’s military to forcefully eject foreign interlopers from territorial waters of the Diaoyu islands.

Despite its increased military presence in the region and the howls of media pundits， China’s authorities seem to have little appetite for a military showdown. While Chinese calls to “leave this issue to posterity” were rejected by Tokyo， which denies that sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands is in dispute， bilateral talks have been resumed.

For example， a Nikkei report on June 7 revealed that the two countries held a meeting in Beijing in April between the defense ministries at bureau chief level. Another Sankei Shimbun report on June 13 claimed that China initiated the establishment of a hotline between the two countries’ air forces to “avoid accidents.”

However， given that Japan’s push for “normalcy” has come alongside Xi Jinping’s pledges of“revival” in China， antagonism and the prospect of conflict， if never manifested in actual war， will continue to shape East Asia’s security landscape for the foreseeable future.