Policing the Police

The downfall of Bo Xilai， former politburo member and Party chief of Chongqing Municipality， and Wang Lijun， the city’s former police chief， was without doubt the most sensational political scandal in China in 2012.

Since the pair’s fall from grace in March 2012， there have been reports on the widespread use of torture by Chongqing police in extracting confessions from the suspects in their harsh crackdown on organized crime that lasted from 2009 to 2012.

The carefully worded court ruling that charged Wang with treason and corruption and sentenced him to 15 years in jail in September 2012， for example， only briefly mentioned Wang’s role in covering up the murder of British national Neil Heywood， a crime reportedly masterminded by Gu Kailai， Bo’s wife. Apart from a few incidences of bribetaking， there was no mention of Wang’s role in the abuse of police power.

Now that the new leadership has assumed power， anti-corruption rhetoric has been ramped up， accompanied by an explosion of reports detailing the systematic violation of the rule of law during Bo and Wang’s crackdown. The iconic anti-gangland campaign helped boost Bo’s popularity nationwide， and made Wang into a crimefighting hero. But now， in the wake of their downfall， many who were persecuted their watch have spoken out， launching appeals for their cases to be readdressed.

‘Red Populism’

Bo and Wang’s most outspoken critic is Li Zhuang， a 51-year-old Beijing-based lawyer who was jailed in early 2010 for defending a particularly sensitive client， alleged mafioso Gong Gangmo. Li was charged with leading his client to commit perjury over the police’s use of torture， an accusation Li fervently denied. On the contrary， Li made allegations of widespread arbitrary detentions and the use of torture to extract confessions during the crackdown.

“My latest client， a local private entrepreneur in his 50s who paid 70 million yuan（US$11 million） in tax every year， had six of his teeth knocked out during torture，” said Li Zhuang. He alleged that there were 24“crackdown centers” across the municipality， which were under the direct control of Wang Lijun， and that torture was routine practice.

According to Li， the torture involved suspending suspects from the ceiling， beatings， and the use of the “tiger seat，” a specially designed chair with belts and braces to bolt suspects upright so that they were kept awake for days. “I myself was forced to sit on one such chair for three days，” said Li. “To my knowledge， the longest spell someone was forced to sit on it was 10 days.”

According to a report in the Chongqing Daily， the municipality’s Party newspaper， more than 5，700 people belonging to more than 500 “gangs” were arrested， and more than 2，000 of them had been convicted by February 2012. In the same month， Wang Lijun， the police chief， entered the US consulate in Chengdu after a dramatic fall-out with Bo Xilai， precipitating Bo’s downfall as well as his own.

“Many of [the victims] may have been guilty of wrongdoing and illegal activity. But their crimes were greatly exaggerated in many cases，” said Li.

Besides the widespread use of torture， another feature of the anti-organized crime crackdown was the massive confiscation of property belonging to alleged “gangsters” or private businesspeople.

The total amount of private assets confiscated during the three-year campaign remains unknown. According to the figure released by the Chongqing police in September 2009， confiscated assets in 2009 alone amounted to 33 billion yuan （US$5.3bn）.

No official figure had been released since then， as the anti-crime campaign dragged on into 2012. In a single case in 2011， Peng Zhimin， franchisee of a local Hilton hotel and a real estate mogul in Chongqing， received a life sentence for “organizing prostitution and crime.” All of his property， worth over 10 billion yuan （US$1.6bn）， was confiscated.

Rough estimates put the total amount of confiscated private property at over 100 billion yuan （US$16bn）， much of which has since been transferred to various State-owned enterprises through various channels.

Li Jun， a local private businessman who fled Chongqing during the crackdown and has remained overseas ever since， told the media that he was put on the wanted list simply because he refused to sell his real estate to the Chongqing government at a very low price. After he fled Chongqing， a number of his family members were arrested. His elder brother received a life sentence for being a“ringleader” involved in organized crime， and his wife was sentenced to one year in prison for booking him an airticket out of Chongqing. All his property， worth 6 billion yuan（US$963 million） in total， was confiscated.

The targets of the crackdown were not limited to the “gangsters，” corrupt officials and businessmen accused of being connected with organized crime， but extended to anyone who dared to challenge Bo and Wang. Peng Hong， a Chongqing resident in his 30s， for instance， was detained in 2009 and kept under police custody for almost two years without trial， simply because he re-posted a political cartoon questioning the legitimacy of the crackdown in an online forum.

In addition to the widespread abuse of power， reports also portray Wang as an erratic and narcissistic tyrant. According to Li Zhuang， Wang had 51 different secretaries during his tenure as Chongqing’s police chief. He fired and punished his staff at will， secretaries included， for the slightest insubordination. Xin Jianwei， one of his secretaries， for example， was detained for over 300 days without trial， just because he argued with something Wang had said. According to Li Zhuang， Xin was beaten so hard that his ears bled.

Another widely cited report claimed that Wang had more than 20 personal photographers who were tasked with capturing his image in moments of glory during the crackdown.

Due to the overall collapse of the rule of law and the ascendancy of strongman politics in Chongqing during Bo’s tenure as Party secretary， many call the gangland crackdown and the ultra-leftist populism that came with it a “mini-Cultural Revolution，” comparing it to the 10-year catastrophe between 1966 and 1976 in which millions of people were persecuted.

Tong Zhiwei， a professor from the East China University of Political Science and Law， called the mafia crackdown “red populism.” “It was cloaked in communism and socialism. In essence， however， it was pure populism，” said Tong in a seminar organized by online political reform forum chinareform. ， entitled “Rule of Law and Lessons From Chongqing.”

Populist Persona

The exposure of the abuse of police power has rekindled discussion among the legal circle on the roots of the abuse in Chongqing and what lessons China should draw from the rise and fall of Bo and Wang.

Arriving in Chongqing in 2007， Bo stood out from other politicians with his tailored business suit， charming smile and abundance of personal charisma. With the slogan “attacking crime and wiping out evil，” Bo championed a bold， egalitarian alternative model of growth， hailed by many as the “Chongqing model，” a term Bo’s successors have refused to acknowledge since his downfall. Accompanying the anti-crime campaign， Bo launched various favorable policies towards ordinary residents， including providing subsidized housing and granting rural residents access to elusive urban household registrations.

In an article published on December 25， 2012 by ， a Hong Kong-based liberal media website， an unnamed high-ranking Chongqing official claimed the main reason that the new Chongqing authorities have refrained from systematically redressing the cases in question is that Bo and Wang remain popular in Chongqing， despite the exposure of their wanton violation of rule of law.

“Many in Chongqing still don’t believe Bo committed a serious crime， and still consider his downfall a result of political persecution，”said the nameless official.

For many experts， the rise of Bo and his Chongqing model was nurtured by populist sentiment and the radicalization of politi- cal views among ordinary Chinese， who are increasingly frustrated at the deterioration of various social problems， such as the gaping income gap， runaway housing prices and widespread corruption. Against this background， when Bo and Wang cracked down on corrupt officials and rich businessmen， many of whom gained their wealth from the real estate industry， they received widespread support from local residents.

“The tragedy of Chinese society is that the people look for some kind of hero [to bring change]， but when such a hero is created， there are no mechanisms to control him，”Wang Liping， a veteran lawyer， told NewsChina.

At the peak of the crackdown in 2009， Wen Qiang， former police chief of Chongqing， was hastily convicted and executed， an action that received plaudits nationwide at the time. In retrospect， legal experts have argued that Wen’s crime was far from a capital one. While officials who embezzled billions of yuan only received life sentences， Wen’s corruption case only involved a few million yuan and an accusation of rape that some say was fabricated （the alleged victim was revealed to be his mistress）， in addition to the charge that he protected gangsters.

When lawyer Li Zhuang was charged with perjury in 2010， and the Chongqing police revealed that Li was paid 1.5 million yuan（US$240，000） to defend “private businessman-turned-mafioso” Gong Gangmo， pub- lic opinion quickly swung against Li. Zhou Litai， a Chongqing-based lawyer known for championing the rights of migrant workers， came under harsh criticism for “betraying the have-nots” after he expressed his concern over the coercive methods used in the crackdown.

“It is evident that Chinese society has been torn apart， with strong antagonism between the haves and the have-nots，” argued Han Deyun， director of the Chongqing Bar Association.

Others have argued that the rise of Bo and Wang was made possible by the flaws in China’s political system. Chen Youxi， a well-known lawyer points out that many of the duo’s practices， such as manipulation of the media， interference with judicial affairs， and incrimination of economic and financial activities are widespread practices in the country. The only difference is that Bo and Wang pushed these approaches to the extreme.

“The lesson learned from the Chongqing experience is that maintaining the status quo promises no political future for the country，”said Chen Youxi. “China must carry out political reform since the people hope for change.”

Since taking power， China’s new leadership has shown great determination to fight corruption dozens of high-level officials have been made subject to investigation within a couple of months since the new administration was unveiled in November. It is expected that a grand income distribution plan will soon be released in an effort to reduce China’s income gap.

However， with serious concerns over rising populism， a prudent incremental approach towards reform seems to be favored by China’s new leadership， which has warned against “Western style” electoral democracy.

In the meantime in Chongqing， little progress has been made in redressing the cases in which the defendants have alleged wrongdoing. While the new leadership in Chongqing has started to review lawyer Li Zhuang’s perjury case as well as several others， no formal judgment has yet been made.